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Abstract This paper presents a model of the way that designers move between situations when interpreting 
during design activity. Three hypotheses are presented that arise from this model: that designers change their 
situation during interpretation, that small changes in a source can lead to large changes in the representation, and 
that changes to the situation have their origins in the experience of the designer. The paper demonstrates how 
this internal movement between situations can be computationally implemented using three examples. The 
systems implemented demonstrate the way that interpretation can lead to changes in the situation and present an 
example of how the changes to a designer’s situation can be guided by past experiences.  
Keywords: situated design, computational modelling, interpretation 
 
Designers frequently change their notion of what they are doing during design, but how this 
happens has not yet been adequately explained, nor has it been modelled computationally. It 
has long been recognised that the expectations held by a designer (the way that they ‘see’) 
have an effect upon their future design moves (Schon & Wiggins, 1992). This work is 
concerned with the question of when do a designer’s expectations change and why do they 
change to one set of expectations and not another? It is an enquiry into the relationship 
between experience and expectation as observed in a design conversation. 
 
Designers’ notions of what they are doing change during design activity, and through think-
aloud studies and video recordings it is possible to observe, to some degree, what their 
notions are changing from and to (Fish & Scrivener, 1990; Gross & Do, 2000; Suwa & 
Tversky, 1997). The motivation for this work is to move beyond observation and to posit the 
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cognitive processes that relate knowledge from experience to the changing conception of a 
design task, with the aim of making computational models of design more ‘designerly’ 
(Cross, 1982). 
 
To place the focus upon the cognitive processes of the designer, design will be conceived 
here as a sequence of actions by a designer, where these actions are distinguishable activities 
over time that take place within a situation (Gero, 1998). The term situation refers here to a 
designer’s internal notion of the world at a particular time, their co-ordinated expectations 
(Clancey, 1997). This definition of situation in design is related to terms that emphasise 
aspects of the same notion: the current internal context (Kennedy & Shapiro, 2004), the 
current epistemic frame (Shaffer et al., 2009) and the current ecology of mind (Gabora, 
Rosch, & Aerts, 2008)
1
. The situation refers to the parts of grounded knowledge (Barsalou, 
2007) that come from experience within the world and that are being used to understand the 
world at this current moment and in this current experience. 
 
The paper first describes a model linking the situation of a designer (and their expectations 
within this situation) to the cognitive process of interpretation – something that occurs 
frequently during the observed seeing-moving-seeing activities of design. It then uses 
computational models to demonstrate how these notions can be used to make models of 
design more designerly, moving from one situation to another in a way that is inspired by 
empirical studies of designers. 
1 Background 
1.1 First person knowledge 
Knowledge can be grounded in experience leading to knowledge that can be described as first 
person knowledge. Although there is no universally agreed definition of knowledge, a 
commonly accepted useful definition of knowledge is that it is a well-grounded belief with 
evidentiary support that is independent of the proponent of the knowledge (Chisholm, 1982). 
This independence of knowledge from its proponent lays the foundation for objective 
knowledge in science. For example, Newton’s laws, once they have been propounded, do not 
depend on the existence of Newton. This kind of knowledge is called “third person” 
                                               
1
 Gero and Smith (2009) focus upon these distinctions of definition. 
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knowledge in that a person removed from the original proponent of the knowledge can 
understand and make use of it. This is in contradistinction to knowledge that individuals gain 
through their experience and that is not independent of them and their experiences and is 
called “first person” knowledge. Much of the lives of individuals are built around first person 
knowledge rather than third person knowledge. 
1.2 Interpretation and unexpected discovery in design 
Whenever a designer brings something from the external world into their internal world, 
interpretation is occurring. For example, when a designer reads a design brief, considers their 
own work whilst sketching, or observes behaviours of a model, interpretation occurs – 
something external is given meaning internally by the designer. The literature reflects this 
movement from interpretation of a source AS a concept (Pylyshyn, 1977) towards 
interpretation as situated conceptualisation (Barsalou, 2009). 
 
The interpretation that a designer produces arises from the interaction between the source 
(what it is that the designer is interpreting), the designer’s previous experiences (the 
knowledge held by the designer) and the situation (the world-view made up from parts of this 
knowledge). This can result in a designer being able to interpret the same work in many 
different ways when in different situations; this is captured in Henry David Thoreau’s 
(1851/1993) statement that “it’s not what you look at that matters but what you see”. 
 
A designer draws upon knowledge from past experiences. This knowledge is made use of 
within the current way of viewing the world (the situation) and as design progresses, the 
situation changes (Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004). The motivation for adopting this 
perspective is to make use of the cognitive processes of changing interpretations of the world 
that appear to occur during design in modelling designing. Existing models of interpretation 
in design have focussed upon analogical transfer (Goel, 1997; Yaner & Goel, 2008).The 
focus in the situated cognition approach is upon the relationships between experience, 
expectation and interpretation.  
1.2.1 Unexpected discovery 
A phenomenon in design that illustrates this change of situation is that of unexpected 
discovery, the invention of design issues and requirements during design activity (Suwa, 
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Gero, & Purcell, 2000). When designers look at their own work they are capable of inventing 
new design issues and intentions, as observed by Gombrich (1966) that “in searching for a 
new solution Leonardo [da Vinci] projected new meanings into the forms he saw in his old 
discarded sketches”. Studies related to this phenomenon (Bilda, Gero, & Purcell, 2006; 
Menezes & Lawson, 2006; Schon & Wiggins, 1992; Suwa, et al., 2000) have typified the 
kinds of discoveries that are made by designers and linked some of these to the situation of 
the designer. Suwa et al (2000) note that whilst some functions arise based upon the list of 
initial requirements, others seem to be invented during design activity, such as those that are 
directed by the use of explicit knowledge or past cases, or those that have been extended from 
a previous goal through concretizing or broadening.  
 
Designers produce new design issues and requirements that are specific to their own 
experiences, that point in time, the state of the design medium, the state of the collaborators 
and the state of the beliefs about the design task. The new design issues and requirements 
indicate a change of situation. In this work a model is articulated for the kinds of cognitive 
processes that might explain how a designer moves from one situation to another, such that to 
an outside observer the designer appears to have invented a goal or intention for the design. 
 
An example of first person knowledge and the movement from one set of expectations to 
another can be seen in this example: 
 
"Our architect once decided to bring a water stream from the open plaza in front of 
the museum building into the entrance hall, as a means to guide visitors into the 
building in a cheerful way. Then, after a while, he noticed that water in the building 
may cause problems because humidity affects the artworks. But, because he thought 
that the idea of bringing water inside is still promising to produce a lively atmosphere, 
he set up a goal to search for a method to let artworks and water co-exist." (Suwa et al 
2000) 
 
In this description, the designer has commenced an activity within one situation (A), wanting 
to bring water into an open plaza as a guide. In interpreting the consequences of this when 
expressed in the design medium, the situation of the designer changes (B), bringing in a new 
goal to find a way of having the water and the artworks co-exist. The question addressed by 
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this paper is about how this movement of situation from A (within which no solution is 
possible) to B (in which a solution is possible) occurs for the designer. A system with the 
required knowledge might be able to use a symbolic AI approach (typified by the subgoaling 
strategy of Newell (1994)) but would not arrive at the same class of solution as the designer 
in the example unless it had unique strategic knowledge about how to connect these two 
disparate domains. Even then the way an AI system might arrive at a solution would not be 
called designerly. 
 
In the example, in drawing from experience during interpretation (observing the possible 
problems of humidity) the designer has invented a new goal (of having artworks and water 
together without the problems of humidity) that is a part of a changed situation. In this paper 
the hypothesis is adopted, following Schon and Wiggins, that the act of interpreting can cause 
the situation to change. The rest of this paper is concerned with describing how this may be 
explained and presenting computational models of this movement.  
2 How designers move between situations during design 
activity 
The remainder of this paper is concerned with describing a way that computational models 
could be made more designerly in their movement between situations. This claim is based 
upon specific conceptions of what is meant by: (i) knowledge representation; (ii) 
expectations; and (iii) interpretation. The contributions of the paper are the model of 
interpretation and three hypotheses about the way that designers move between situations. 
The three hypotheses are: 
1. the process of ‘constructing’ an interpretation can lead to a change in the designer’s 
situation; 
2. small changes in the source (of an interpretation) can lead to large changes in the internal 
representation; and 
3. changes to the situation have their origins in the experiences of the designer.  
 
2.1 Knowledge representation 
An attempt to model interpretation computationally requires a computational model of 
knowledge. In representing knowledge in a way that is suitable for modelling situated design 
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the same experiences can be utilised differently in different situations (Peng & Gero, 2006). 
This feature can be observed within knowledge as described as a Perceptual Symbol System 
(PSS; Barsalou, 1999, 2005). This is in contrast to an amodal symbol system, in which 
cognitive representations use a language which does not have a perceptual basis, e.g. natural 
language or abstract symbols (Fodor, 1975; Minsky, 1974; Pylyshyn, 1984). In a PSS, what 
starts as information in each of the senses becomes abstracted to the level where it can be 
manipulated as symbols, a transition from sub-symbolic to symbolic (Harnad, 1999). The 
PSS provides a paradigm for knowledge representation, and this is instantiated in our models 
using the conceptual spaces framework of Gärdenfors (2000). The conceptual spaces model 
has the advantage of being demonstrably useful for computation (Beyer, Cimiano, & 
Griffiths, 2012; Gärdenfors, 2000) and meets the requirements for a situated design agent 
outlined by Gero and Fujii (2000) once the layer of situation is added to this framework. A 
brief description of this framework with the required modification is presented. 
2.1.1 Conceptual spaces (with the addition of situations) 
Abstraction is critical for representing knowledge in a PSS (Barsalou, 2005). In this paper we 
will refer to four levels of abstraction as a useful delineation, following on from Gärdenfors 
(2000) in describing sensation, perception and conception and Clancey (1999) in adding 
situations to co-ordinate concepts.  
 
An agent has sensors which produce data during interaction with the external world. For 
example, an eye can sense changes in light, an ear changes in air pressure. Each datum from a 
sensor interacting with the world is referred to as a senscept (Montare, 1994). A senscept 
implies a dimension. For example, a human eye might generate a senscept for each of hue, 
brightness and saturation at a point in time (Gärdenfors, 2000). A dimension is the one-
dimensional space within which the senscepts are located. Each dimension is a continuous 
variable of a certain range. Dimensions that are inseparable create a perceptual domain 
within which percepts are located. Inseparable means that the agent cannot get information 
for one of the dimensions without getting information for all of them. To continue the 
previous example: in the human eye, hue cannot be obtained without also obtaining 
brightness and saturation (Gärdenfors, 2000). A perceptual domain (e.g. texture, colour) is a 
space with dimensions of those things that the agent can sense. In the example of colour 
being sensed by hue, brightness and chromaticity, this results in a three-dimensional domain. 
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Senscepts from a stimulus are grouped together to create a percept represented by a value 
within this perceptual domain. A percept within a perceptual domain is a vector space arising 
from the perceptual dimensions that constitute it. 
 
A concept is a convergence zone that brings together spaces within perceptual domains that 
experience has shown to be related. For example, the concept for banana might bring 
together areas in the colour domain that might be called yellow, green and brown with areas 
in a shape domain that are associated with the Lady Finger and Cavendish banana varieties. It 
implicitly adopts a prototype theory of concepts where the most typical perceptual regions 
(e.g. the colours and shapes above for a banana) are associated and less typical instances of a 
concept have some distance (measured in conceptual space) from a prototype (Murphy, 
2002). Figure 1 shows the way that dimensions create the space of a perceptual domain, and 
the way that a concept associates regions in domains with each other. A part of the meaning 
of a concept comes from its relationship with other concepts. Just one layer is described here, 
although humans hold concepts at many layers of abstraction (Rosch, 1978). 
 
The strength of this formulation is that there is now a geometric representation of senscepts, 
percepts and concepts. Within this space, similarity can be calculated as the distance between 
two points within conceptual space (Gärdenfors, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988). This is important for 
interpretation, where similarity to existing concepts plays a role in determining whether the 
expectations are able to account for what the agent is experiencing. 
 
Situations can be thought of as a convergence zone for these concepts – the memory of the 
co-ordination of concepts (Barsalou, 1999; Clancey, 1997, 1999). Concepts that are utilised at 
the same time within an agent are a part of the same situation. The framework of Gärdenfors 
(2000) is extended here by introducing a situation as a collection of concepts. The utility of a 
situation is that it allows for the explicit representation of the world view that arises from the 
use of a particular network of concepts. 
 
Situation is different from the other layers because it alone does not receive expectations 
from a layer above it. For example, perception knows what to expect of sensation because 
conception passes expectations down to it. In contrast, situation relies upon grounded 
experience alone. 
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Figure 1 Levels in a hierarchy of knowledge organisation for design 
2.2 Expectations 
A designer holds knowledge about the world from their experience. At a certain moment in 
time, some of this knowledge is explicitly being utilised as the explicit expectations of a 
designer. Asking the question “What are you doing now?” (Clancey, 1999) and think-aloud 
studies (Wright & Monk, 1985) are ways to get a sense of these expectations. 
 
This explicit knowledge is a part of the situation of the designer. In addition the designer 
holds implicit knowledge from the situation within the internal context of other knowledge 
from experience. An agent creates connections between different layers within the knowledge 
representation through experience as part of what is termed ‘memory’. Only some of these 
connections are utilised as a part of the explicit expectations. Implicit expectations, what 
might be described as connections that are below a liminal threshold, are connections which 
exist but of which the agent is not aware. Implicit memory is “when performance on a task is 
facilitated in the absence of conscious recollection" (Graf & Schacter, 1985). 
 
The effect of implicit memory can be observed in studies of priming, when exposure to a 
stimulus affects the response to a subsequent stimulus. Experiments have demonstrated both 
perceptual priming of forms and conceptual priming of categories (Schacter, 1987). Priming 
phenomena make use of connections from past experiences to improve the speed of 
recognition. 
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2.3 Interpretation within a situation 
Interpretation is defined here from a situated cognition perspective as a continuous, dynamic, 
constructive activity that attempts to construct an internal representation from a source, using 
expectations where it is possible and constructing an explanation from existing knowledge 
where it is not. Following Piaget (1954), interpretation is concerned with reconciling the two 
opposing goals of: (i) maintaining a stable notion of the world; and (ii) changing the picture 
of the world when the world changes. These two goals can be described following Gero and 
Kannengeisser (2004) as: (i) a pull from expectations in each layer of the knowledge 
hierarchy attempting to construct what is expected from the information arriving about the 
world; and (ii) a push of data from the external world flowing up the hierarchy of abstraction 
causing expectations to be changed. 
 
An example can be used to show the difference between push and pull. A stimulus can 
demand attention, ‘pushing' its way into sensation, such as the way that regardless of your 
expectations when your mobile phone rings, you notice it. Pull shows the way that 
expectations can change an experience. Consider that you are attempting to meet up with a 
friend in a crowd. Based on observing the back of somebody's head you think that you see 
your friend and rush to catch up with them. However, as you get closer you realise that they 
look only a little like your friend. This is an example of pull because the expectations of 
seeing the friend have changed the way that the world is seen: the interpretation has been 
constructed from expectations. 
2.3.1 A model of interpretation as a constructive activity 
Interpretation begins with pull, an attempt to construct what is expected from what is 
available. The output of pull is interpreted data of the type described by the layer. The 
interpreted data from pull in sensation, perception, conception and situation respectively are 
senscepts, percepts, concepts and situations. Pull tries to construct expectations from the 
source for the layer. Push is the part of interpretation that begins with the source. The term 
source is used to refer to the object of interpretation because it recognises that from any 
source it is possible to pull many different kinds of interpreted data. There will be times when 
expectations are not able to be constructed, when there are incorrect expectations or when 
something new is encountered. Push is one part of interpretation that allows for the 
unexpected to be recognised and allows for new knowledge to be learned. 
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It is through push that the first hypothesis arises, which holds that push from source data can 
change the expectations of an agent during interpretation. When the current expectations of 
an agent are not able to account for the data from the source, a change of expectations are 
expected to occur. 
 
A layer in a system of interpretation is shown in Figure 2, in which the curved arrow 
represents an attempt to reconcile data from the source with expectations held prior to 
interpretation. All layers in this proposed system utilise the process of interpretation, but at a 
different level of abstraction. 
 
 
Figure 2 Interpretation within a layer as push from a source and pull from expectations, represented as a curved 
arrow attempting to create the expectations using data from the source  
 
An example of pull is used to help understand the description of the pull arrow used in Figure 
2. Participants in an experiment were played an audio track, consisting of a continuous 
musical note interrupted by white noise, followed by the resumption of the original note. 
People in this experiment are able to hear the note continuing through the middle of the white 
noise (Riecke, van Opstal, Goebel R, & Formisano, 2007). This is an example of perception 
in the auditory system pulling out from the white noise the continuation of the note that it 
expects to be finding. 
 
Figure 3 shows a dynamic system constructed from multiple self-similar layers of the type 
seen in Figure 2, inspired by the work of Mountcastle (1997). Each layer attempts to 
construct what it expects to find from what is available in the layer below. The layer makes 
data available to the layer above, and feeds back information to the layer below to alter its 
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expectations. Another way to describe this is that interpreted data flows up and changed 
expectations flow down. 
 
This is the basis for the second hypothesis which is that the system for interpretation seen in 
Figure 3 is a complex system, in which small departures from expectations can lead to large 
changes in the world view of the agent. It is difficult to predict the changes that will occur in 
the system when one layer is changed, as either a small change in the topmost layer can lead 
to large changes in the layers below or a small change in a lower layer can result in all layers 
changing.  
 
Figure 3 The dynamic system resulting from multiple layers with the presence of feedback from the interpreted 
data of one layer to the expectations of the layer below 
 
The third hypothesis has its origins in the observation that the connections within and 
between layers at different levels of abstraction are developed through experience; and that 
the movement to a different expectation is guided by these connections and the data 
available. Through interaction with the world over the course of its life, the agent has 
developed connections within a layer (e.g. between concepts and concepts) and between 
layers (e.g. between concepts and percepts). The suggestion is that the design conversation 
with a medium is a way of the designer navigating their knowledge from experience. 
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3 Modelling movement between situations during design 
activity 
These three hypotheses are further explored through computational models of interpretation. 
The models use the conceptual spaces knowledge representation described in Section 2 to co-
ordinate their notions about the world in a situated way, and perform constructive 
interpretation through push and pull. A description of these models serves to demonstrate the 
computability of the approach and to give preliminary evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the type of interpretation described here results in systems that change their expectations in a 
designerly way. 
3.1 The approach 
Self-Organising Maps (SOMs) (Kohonen, 1990) facilitate unsupervised learning as well as 
having a straightforward learning algorithm, making them suitable for adaptation to a 
hierarchy of SOMs (Dittenbach, Merkl, & Rauber, 2000) and for experimenting with 
feedback and feedforward within the resulting hierarchy.  
 
The models described use two linked SOMs to create a model of interpretation with two 
layers of abstraction. Figure 4 shows two connected SOMs, where the activation of nodes in 
the lower layer forms the input into the higher layer, marking an abstraction from the data. 
The lower layer creates an abstraction from input data whilst the higher layer creates an 
abstraction over the activity of the lower layer. Interpretation within the linked network uses 
both pull (from expectations, with feedback through the network) and push (from data, with 
feedforward through the network). 
 
An overview of push and pull within a two layer neural network as a sequence of steps is 
presented in Figure 5. Step 1 in Figure 5 is an attempt to pull from expectations in layer 1. If 
pull cannot occur, then step 2 is to push from the source. Either from push or pull, the 
interpreted data from layer 1 is the data available to the layer above, layer 2. Step 3 is an 
analog for step 1, where layer 2 attempts to pull from expectations using the data available 
from layer 1. If the expectations of layer 2 cannot be used for pull, then push into layer 2 
occurs, step 4. This is different to push in layer 1 because it is the topmost layer and there are 
no higher layers in which to test expectations. Push in layer 2, step 4, results in either: (i) a 
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change to different expectations that are more suited; or (ii) the construction of a new 
expectation based upon the data. 
 
 
Figure 4 Linked SOMs representing abstraction from data. 
 
If the expectations change in layer 2 then the expectations of layer 1 are updated as feedback, 
step 5. Step 1 is now repeated, but with new expectations, step 6. This cycle can be iterated 
and extended to multiple linked networks. 
 
Figure 5 Push-pull in a two layer system with numbered steps: 1 pull from expectations in layer 1; 2 push from 
the source into layer 1; 3 pull from the expectations of layer 2; 4 push from layer 1 into layer 2; 5 an update of 
layer 1 expectations by layer 2; and 6 interpretation through pull from layer 1 with the updated expectations. 
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3.1.1 Describing the implementation 
Two SOMs are implemented to represent the lower layer of abstraction      and the higher 
layer of abstraction     . Each is a 2D SOM described by the number of nodes in each 
dimension,   and  , and a number of features,  , Equations 1 and 2. 
              (1) 
               (2) 
During training, each SOM uses the Kohonen training algorithm (Kohonen, 1990) in a two 
phase training of: (i) reducing the neighbourhood radius to 1; and (ii) reducing the learning 
increment from 0.1 to 0. If an input vector of   is introduced to the network then the best 
matching node          is the one that has the least Euclidian distance           . 
 
In training, the outputs from      form the inputs into      with co-ordination of multiple 
outputs forming a single input. The situated effects described here only take effect following 
training. 
 
In a typical SOM the set of all nodes                                is used to 
establish the      In the models described here expectations are implemented as a subset of 
all nodes  
            (3) 
 
The similarity in the models is defined by the Nosofsky distance (Nosofsky, 1988) between 
the input and best matching unit             
       
 
. A similarity threshold   is defined 
as a minimum similarity required for pull to occur in the system. Pull can only occur within a 
SOM if the inequality described in Equation 4 holds. 
 
                        (4) 
 
When the set described by Equation 4 is empty in     , a cue is given to      that a 
change of expectations is required. This comes from the layer above. If this is the top layer 
then the     here is used. The change to   is in this way a function of the output from the 
layer above. 
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3.2 Implementations to demonstrate the three hypotheses 
Three implementations of this approach serve to model aspects of the three hypotheses. Two 
implementations highlight specific consequences of constructive interpretation, whilst the 
third implementation provides a model of how this looks in a synthesised design 
conversation. 
3.2.1 Changing situations in a model of constructive interpretation 
Two linked self-organising maps as seen in Figure 5 were trained on a set of representations 
generated pseudo-randomly by an algorithm. Each representation was made up of three 
shapes in a linear sequence, with each shape overlaid upon a tartan grid. The network was 
initially trained on 500,000 such representations. The rules for generating each representation 
in the training phase were:  
(i) Each of the three tartan grids is 16 x 16 squares in size 
(ii) The first square is filled with a randomly determined shape. This means 
randomly selecting one of three algorithms for filling in black squares in the 
tartan grid to create one of three possible shapes: a square, a cross or a 
triangle. Each algorithm allowed for a random width and height  
(iii) The other two squares are subsequently filled out to produce one of two 
patterns: (a) with all three squares the same shape, although potentially 
different sizes through random generation; or (b) with all three shapes 
different, again with potentially different sizes. 
 
The representation at t=1 in Figure 6 gives an example of a representation of three squares 
produced in this way. The model makes use of expectations that are both spatial and temporal 
in nature. Spatial expectations relate to the idea that observed co-occurring instances will 
occur together again. Temporal expectations relate to the idea that an observed sequential 
progression will occur again. The rules described above in training are manifested in the 
network as what can be described as expectations, that could be inferred by a human observer 
as a heuristic, e.g. if it sees two shapes the same it will have expectations that the third shape 
will be similar. 
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Figure 6 Four representations (left block) and internal representation after interpreting (right block) as a time 
sequence (the light grey is an artefact of the abstraction that occurs during training of the SOM). 
 
In the test phase of the model following training, a series of three random shapes were 
produced to create representations that may or may not obey the rules presented during 
training. For example, two squares and a triangle was a possible representation in the test 
phase. Constructive interpretation occurred in the test phase of the model through: 
(i) Temporal explicit expectations: The trained network held expectations that the 
shapes seen at time t will still be present at time t+1. For example, if it has seen 
three squares at time t it will attempt to construct three squares at time t+1. If the 
similarity threshold is not satisfied at each level of the network then the 
expectation needs to be changed 
(ii) Spatial implicit expectations: When interpretation in a layer is unable to 
construct what it is expecting to find, the network changes its expectations. The 
knowledge structure present in the agent from training guides this change of 
expectations. In this case, this is a spatial expectation that if, for example, one 
square is found then it will expect to find two more squares or two different 
shapes. This is a movement that is guided by the proximity of nodes within the 
network of SOMs. 
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The motivation for this model is to provide confirmatory evidence for the first and third 
hypotheses. In this model it can be seen that the process of ‘constructing’ an interpretation 
can lead to a change in the situation. The active nodes in the layers of the model represent 
explicit expectations about what will be observed. In some cases, what it is expecting to see 
will be used in constructing an interpretation, and have the model seeing something different 
to what is observed by a human observer. In other cases the model will not be able to 
construct from these active nodes, and in changing active nodes can be said to have its 
expectations changed by interpretation, moving it to a different situation. In this case of 
changed expectations, the third hypothesis gives an understanding of the relationship between 
past experiences and the model moves to one situation and not another. 
 
An example of the results produced by the model is shown in Figure 6. The hypothesised 
effects of constructive interpretation occur at times t=2 and t=3 where the model produces an 
internal representation different to what a human observer might see due to its expectations. 
At time t=2 the model has an expectation of seeing three squares. This expectation is strong 
enough, or the data is similar enough, that the lower layer can construct what it is expecting 
from what it sees and because it can only work with what it is presented, the higher layer 
does the same. In this case the temporal expectation has been used to construct the internal 
representation. The case at time t=3 is an example of change of situation occurring through 
interpretation. The temporal expectations have not been useful as there is not sufficient 
similarity to construct from these expectations. In this case, the network uses implicit 
expectations to find something that does fit. The way that this occurs in the model is that the 
two cross shapes are constructed in the lower layer (push), a situation is moved to in the 
higher layer that fits the new information (push), the expectations of the lower layer are 
changed (feedback) and the lower layer is able to construct from what is expected, resulting 
in the stable internal representation. 
 
This example can be used to describe the third hypothesis. The model holds a set of explicit 
expectations in each of the two layers, modelled as active nodes. The nodes that are proximal 
to these nodes, at each layer of abstraction, represent implicit expectations. They are implicit 
because when expectations change, these are the first expectations to be used without being 
liminal . And the reason that these nodes are proximal is that during training the association 
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was reinforced. In this way a relationship can be established between past experiences, the 
current situation and why a move occurred to another particular situation. 
3.2.2 Variation on the model 
A variation on this model serves to explore the second hypothesis; that small changes in the 
sources can lead to large changes in the interpretation. The model was trained in the same 
way on similar shapes
2
, Figure 7. The difference in this model was that that rather than a 
different unrelated representation at each point in time, the model had a gradually changing 
environment. The environment changed over time, from a representation that followed the 
rules (e.g. three crosses) and then moved from this through to another representation resulting 
from the rules (e.g. three squares). This movement occurred over time by a type of 
‘keyframing’, first adding and then removing filled squares within the tartan grid, Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Four representations of a gradually changing environment (left block) and internal representation after 
interpreting (right block) as a time sequence 
 
In Figure 7, at time t=0 the model has interpreted the source as three crosses. This 
interpretation is unchanged at time t=1 despite the observation that environment has changed 
during this time, as interpretation is still able to construct what it is expecting from what is 
available. However, at time t=2 the model can no longer construct the expected interpretation 
                                               
2
 The only difference here is in the inclusion of a different kind of ‘diagonal’ cross  
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of three crosses. A small change in the environment has led to the situation changing based 
upon the data available. Now the source is interpreted as a cross, a triangle and a square. 
 
This is an example of the second hypothesis, and represents the kind of phenomena seen 
during design activity where a designer can carry out activity within a situation for some time 
before, to an outside observer, there appears to be a large shift in the way that the design task 
is conceived with a change in situation. The small changes to the environment can result in a 
stable interpretation that suddenly changes in a way that to an external observer is not 
commensurate to the small change in the environment. 
 
A further variation demonstrates an extension of the approach beyond working with shapes. 
The same phenomenon can be observed in an environment composed of ‘letters’ to create the 
phenomenon of seeing words to which we are habituated. A similar training phase occurred 
in the setup for this demonstration, using letters as a special type of shape
3
. The rules for 
constructing representations were to use solely combinations of letters found in the English 
language
4
. In the example shown in Figure 8 the model sees the letters HHT as the word 
HAT. This same result can be achieved with a straightforward application of an AI algorithm 
(e.g. a typical SOM network). The suggestion is that the way in which the model arrives at an 
interpretation, by distributing the interpretation over layers of abstraction with each 
attempting to construct from what is available, is more designerly. It involves conceptual co-
ordination over both space and time and instead of a ‘one-shot’ approach in which either an 
interpretation is found or not, there is a dynamic convergence. In the example the lower layer 
is not able to construct what it is expecting to find in the case of the letter A. However, the 
upper layer is able to construct what is it is expecting to find, a word that corresponds to 
experience. The feedback from this upper layer’s satisfaction of expectation feeds into the 
lower layer and the interpretation is settled upon – in this case from the top down.  
                                               
3
 Algorithms were written for each of the letters A, E, H and T such that a letter of a random size was produced 
4
 The words HAT, CAT, EAT, ATE 
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Figure 8 Conceptual co-ordination in space and time 
 
This simple model of constructive interpretation and its variations provides a demonstration 
of the hypotheses proposed in section 2. In the models, interpretation occurs in a situation. 
The expectations in this situation guide the construction of an internal representation, and 
also implicitly suggest the next situation if expectations change during interpreting. The 
model of constructive interpretation is one of dynamic convergence distributed across layers 
of abstraction, with feedforward of data and feedback of expectations.  
3.4 A model of constructive interpretation in the design conversation 
A further model demonstrates how these hypotheses relate to our understanding of designers 
engaged in a design conversation with a medium. As observed by Schön and Wiggins and in 
studies of unexpected discovery, designers move between different interpretations of a design 
medium. A question asked by observers of a designer is often ‘why this novel interpretation 
and not some other?’. The three hypotheses of constructive interpretation are modelled in a 
system engaged in designerly behaviour of ‘moving’ and ‘seeing’. 
 
A network was first trained on a set of 54 floor plans, Figure 9. These floor plans are a 
selection from the work of three prominent architects: Frank Lloyd Wright, Louis Khan and 
Andrea Palladio. They were used as there is existing work showing that there is a correlation 
between the perception of similarity in these sketches in humans and in neural networks 
(Jupp, 2005; Jupp & Gero, 2010). The system perceived each image by first using edge 
detection and a sharpening algorithm on the images and then feeding the resulting black and 
white pixels into the lower layer of the network as a sequence of 16x16 features. In the model 
a single floor plan becomes represented as a number of perceptual maps co-ordinated within a 
situation, Figure 10. 
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Figure 9 A sample of 16 floor plans from the full set of 54 plans by Palladio, Lloyd Wright and Khan (source: 
(Jupp, 2005)) 
 
As a result of this training the set of these 54 floor plans comes to be represented within the 
same two maps each at a different level of abstraction. At the lower level of the two 
networks, similarities can be measured across different experiences. For example, one of the 
perceptual maps from a Khan floor plan might be more perceptually similar (in terms of 
distance within the perceptual map) to a perceptual map from a Palladio floor plan than it is 
to another Khan floor plan. 
 
The model begins activity with a set of expectations, taking one of the floor plans from 
experience and utilising the perceptual features associated with it for generating designs by 
randomly placing the perceptual features in the design medium – this is the starting point for 
the model. The system generates each step in the process by first interpreting the design 
medium, and then erasing it. It continues by randomly placing elements once again (the 
explicit expectations at the perceptual level) into the design medium. It uses the lower level 
maps that the system holds from its training in the different floor plans of well-known 
architects. 
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Figure 10 Representations of experience of floor plans within the network 
 
A snapshot of the model in progress is in Figure 11. The four images on the left-hand side 
show the four explicit perceptual expectations that the model is using in generating a design. 
The image at the top-centre shows the current state of the design external to the system in the 
design medium. Below this in the centre is a representation of the floor plan from experience 
that is implicitly associated with these expectations. The right-hand side shows the perceptual 
features that have been used as a result of interpretation.  
 
 
Figure 11 Interpreting using explicit concepts after random generation 
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Interpretation is done through a ‘sliding window’ that saccades across the image attempting 
to construct an interpretation from expectations and stopping when four interpreted percepts 
have been found. The heuristics for this movement are: 
1. attempt to construct from explicit perceptual expectations within the current window; 
2. attempt to construct from implicit perceptual expectations within the current window; 
and 
3. move the window to the right; if the edge is found move the window down and start 
again from the left. 
 
Putting this together, the model follows iterations of: 
1. commence with a set of explicit expectations; 
2. randomly generate a design using these expectations;  
3. interpret this design using its current expectations but potentially using implicit 
expectations; and 
4. repeat from step 1. 
 
In the example seen in Figure 11, the explicit expectations of percepts have all been found in 
interpreting – in other words, the situation after interpreting is no different to the situation 
before interpreting. 
 
What happens when the model finds concepts that are implicitly expected is shown in Figure 
12. Implicit expectations within the model are those that are similar (as defined by distance 
within conceptual space) to explicit expectations. What this means in practice is that as the 
model is generating and interpreting as it creates novel interpretations for existing design 
elements. This changes the situation as these implicit expectations are brought into the design 
situation. In the model, this was made into an iterative process by then drawing with these 
concepts that are the new explicit expectations. The result is that the model is exploring its 
own knowledge from experience in a series of steps. The guides for exploring its own 
knowledge are: (i) the conceptual similarity between explicit expectations and other 
expectations that exist from experience; and (ii) the relationships in the design medium that 
emerge. 
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Figure 12 The system constructs an interpretation using two of implicit expectations and two explicit 
expectations 
 
The effect of this is that the model works within its current understanding of the design 
problem until something triggers a change of situation, Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13 Each grey ellipsoid is a situation that contains the set of implicit and explicit expectations. Each black 
circle is the internal conception of the current design within this situation. Time progression is represented 
through black arrows of changing conceptions of design and changing situations. 
 
In the model, making an interpretation can lead to the situation changing, with different 
expectations present. The contribution of the model is to show how the relationship between 
past experiences and these changes of situation. There is the potential for movement to new 
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expectations within each layer of abstraction. This can lead, for example, to low level 
perceptual similarity serving as a cue for new higher level expectations. The model 
demonstrates how the hypotheses that emerge from this model of interpretation may come to 
be related to phenomena observed in designers. 
3.5 Discussion from the models 
In Section 2 a model of interpretation that fits with a description of situated design was 
presented. Selected results have been presented to show how aspects of such a system can be 
implemented. The critical features of the models as they relate to the three hypotheses can be 
summarised as follows. 
 Expectations exist at different levels of abstraction. 
 Interpretation involves three activities: (i) constructing from existing expectations 
using data available; (ii) changing expectations when existing expectations do not 
work; and (iii) distributing this across multiple layers of abstraction through 
feedforward of data and feedback of expectations. This relates to the first hypothesis, 
that interpretation can change a designer’s situation. 
 Through push (from data) and pull (from expectations) there is a balance between a 
stable world and the potential for a changing interpretation of it. This relates to the 
second hypothesis, and can appear to an external observer as a small change in the 
external source leading to a large change in the designer’s situation. 
 A change of expectations is relative to the current expectations; an analogy is that past 
experiences are a map, current expectations are a location and change of expectations 
is movement within this landscape. As expectations are distributed across different 
layers of abstraction with links between them within and across layers, this 
relationship between past experiences and changes to the situation can be complex. 
This relates to the third hypothesis, that the organisation of knowledge arising from 
experience (such as within a PSS) is important for understanding why a designer 
makes one move (in the way that they view the design medium) and not another. 
3.5.1 Testing models of interpretation 
The three hypotheses about how designers move from one situation to another arise from the 
description of situated interpretation presented in Section 2. Implementations have been 
described that demonstrate these hypotheses, but the reporting of these implementations has 
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been limited in its aim to demonstrating rather than verifying these hypotheses. The results 
presented here are insufficient to claim that they emulate the findings of the cognitive studies 
referred to in Section 1. A reason for this is that there is no established methodology for 
testing the situatedness of how a system interprets. 
 
A pair of metrics can be proposed that could help facilitate verification of these hypotheses in 
future. The first is a metric for the similarity of the external source to the internal 
representations produced. Some relationship between the two is clearly a requirement of 
interpretation. The second is a metric of reinterpretation frequency, the frequency with which 
a system interprets the same source differently. It is expected that a situated system would 
have the capacity for frequent reinterpretation whilst having a high degree of similarity. 
Although this formulation is incomplete as it fails to take into account the different levels of 
abstraction during interpretation, however, if such metrics could be established there would 
be potential to conduct cognitive studies of the way that designers interpret. Then models of 
interpretation such as the one described and implemented here could be tested using such 
studies. These models of the design conversation could be termed generate-and-interpret in 
that they place the focus on producing models of design in which interpretation occurs in a 
designerly way. 
3.5.2 Limitations of the system 
A limitation of the implementations described here is that in interpretation there were 
occasions where neither explicit expectations in the situation, nor implicit expectations from 
a guided search of knowledge, could adequately construct an explanation for the data that a 
layer was finding. The implementations here did not include a model of situated learning, 
which would occur in this circumstance. These models utilised a heuristic to progressively 
reduce the similarity threshold until an interpretation results. 
 
A further limitation is that the implementation makes use of two linked SOM maps, but the 
ideas could be implemented in many other ways. Similar results would be expected with 
ART networks (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1988) and potentially hierarchical ART networks 
that could be adapted to fit (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1990; Tscherepanow, 2010). Adapting 
existing hierarchical unsupervised learning systems such as deep belief networks (Hinton, 
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Osindero, & Teh, 2006; Lee, Grosse, Ranganath, & Ng, 2009) to hold expectations in a way 
that fits the notions of situatedness described here, is a potential avenue of further research. 
 
The implementations described here make use of single-thread programming, however future 
work has the potential explore what happens when this process of interpretation occurs in 
parallel within each layer. This can produce a dynamic system of interpretation as described 
in Section 2. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper has conceptually linked the expectations of the designer to the process of 
interpretation using a computational model of design cognition. It has articulated a model for 
interpretation in design that accounts for the situated nature of design activity. Three 
hypotheses arose from the model of interpretation for situated design, and these were 
demonstrated through computational implementation. 
 
The contribution is in looking towards ways that computational models of design could be 
made more designerly. In this paper the expectations held by a designer have been linked to 
the process of interpretation, and a change of situation linked to a change of expectations. 
These models demonstrate the way that interpretation uses expectations resulting in the type 
of phenomena observed in designers bringing knowledge into the design situation and 
changing their ideas about the activity in which they are engaged.  
 
It has been proposed that changes to the situation happen at multiple levels of abstraction 
within such a model of a designer and that when expectations are not met, the implicit 
conceptual similarity guides the movement to new expectations. This can be observed in the 
results from the computational implementation, which provide support for three hypotheses 
about design. 
 
It was hypothesised that attempts to construct an interpretation using expectations can lead to 
a change in the situation. This was observed within the models when during the process of 
attempting to construct an interpretation from expectations, these expectations were not met, 
leading to a change of expectations. This resulting change of situation, to an external 
observer, looks like the phenomenon of changing situations in a designer. 
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Small changes in a source can lead to large changes in the internal representation. It was 
observed that small changes in the stimulus outside the model can result in a large change in 
the situation. This was observed most clearly in the model of a gradually changing 
environment that maintains the situation until it is no longer useful, at which point the 
situation can change quite dramatically.  
 
Changes to the situation have their origin in the experiences of the designer, manifested as 
connections between knowledge. When the situation changes, it changes in ways that are 
related to the first person knowledge of the designer from past experiences. In the model one 
heuristic for a way that this could occur has been expressed, as spreading activation at 
different layers of abstraction. 
 
The primary contribution of this work is in utilising concepts from situated cognition to 
model the way that designers explore their own knowledge through interpretation in a way 
that in inspired by observed behaviour in cognitive studies. Rather than answering the 
original question of how designers move between situations, the work presented has raised 
further questions. Whilst existing cognitive studies of designers have inspired the hypotheses 
of this work, they only implicitly support them as the internal cognition of designers has not 
been reported in these studies. Future studies need to be carried out to explicitly test the way 
that designers move from one situation to another. 
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